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New Thinking on Commercial Surrogacy
RICHARD F. STORROW∗
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles’s Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial
Intimacy imagines that a less polarized vision of commercial surrogacy will
emerge from reconsidering commercial surrogacy arrangements through lenses of
relational autonomy and mixed commodification. This commentary finds much to
appreciate in Laufer-Ukeles’s contribution and urges a more expansive
examination of surrogacy to include its international dimension.
INTRODUCTION
Our enduring fascination with commercial surrogacy1 stems from the deeply
emotional reactions it engenders, reactions that in some parts of the world have
become enshrined in legislation. While some jurisdictions that prohibit surrogacy
view it as per se exploitative and as inappropriately commodifying human
reproduction, others see surrogacy as a way to help infertile people have children,
to promote economic opportunity, and to accord women who wish to be surrogates
a measure of autonomy. Somewhere in the middle lie countries that allow
surrogacy because they wish to help the infertile but do not believe that paying for
surrogacy is appropriate. The divide between commercial surrogacy and no
surrogacy at all is vast and its consequences far-reaching. Those who cannot
employ surrogates in their own country travel to countries where they can.2 The
children born may be considered somehow “illegitimate,” suffering an ambiguous
civil status and not recognized as belonging to both of their intended parents.3 Just
as an unregulated surrogacy industry would likely result in emotional and financial
damage to both would-be parents and surrogates alike, an antisurrogacy stance
aimed at stamping out exploitation and commodification leads to other harsh
realities with which we must grapple.
Although both the pro- and the antisurrogacy points of view tend to
predetermine the position one will assume on the various issues within the debate,4
neither point of view seems well grounded in empirical data, in part because we
cannot agree on what constitutes exploitation or on what it is we are commodifying
when we permit commercial surrogacy. On the other side of the spectrum, the
purported benefits of surrogacy are contextual both in place and time. Whereas it

∗ Professor of Law, City University of New York.
1. The term “commercial surrogacy” is widely used to mean surrogacy that entails
compensation or payment in addition to the reimbursement of expenses. This is in contrast to
“altruistic surrogacy,” which is understood to allow reimbursing the surrogate for her
expenses.
2. Shan Li, Chinese Couples Come to U.S. to Have Children Through Surrogacy, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/19/business/la-fi-china-surrogate20120219.
3. Richard F. Storrow, “The Phantom Children of the Republic”: International
Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 561 (2012).
4. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy,
88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1245–47 (2013).
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may appear to some that a child already born to a surrogate is best raised by the
intended parents who have expended considerable emotional and financial
resources to create him, others would argue nonetheless that the benefit to the
surrogate from such an arrangement is questionable where she has no other
practical option for earning money. None of this is to suggest that principled
positions for or against surrogacy require empirical grounding. But at the same time
empirical evidence at least allows us to test our assumptions about surrogacy where
neither the argument from exploitation nor the one from autonomy forecloses much
doubt about which direction we should pursue.5 Recognizing this, we may decide in
effect that it matters a great deal that neither of the extreme positions accurately
reflects what actually happens in these transactions and that a more nuanced
understanding is in order.6 This is precisely what Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, in
Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, aims to achieve. Given
the intractability of the disagreement, another set of considerations is required if we
are to have a productive dialogue about the surrogacy arrangements that do take
place and appear to work7 despite our abstract fears or uninformed enthusiasm
about involving gestational surrogates in the way we have children.8
Entering a debate whose terms have been fixed for so long is not easy, but
Laufer-Ukeles rises ably to the challenge. Laufer-Ukeles does indeed believe that
empirical findings matter and “should inform the way we think about surrogate
motherhood.”9 She urges, in contrast to those who believe philosophical theories
alone can resolve the surrogacy debate, that we examine “circumstances,
conditions, and surrounding relationships”10 so as hopefully to bring the opposing
poles of the surrogacy debate into a constructive dialogue about how best to
regulate it. In the course of her analysis, Laufer-Ukeles fashions a practical
regulatory framework with the aid of the theories of relational autonomy and mixed
commodification. Her regulatory scheme is capable at once of owning the
commercial aspect of the surrogacy transaction and promoting the humanity and
dignity of surrogate mothers.11
I. COMMERCIAL SURROGACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Laufer-Ukeles makes clear from the outset that her analytical framework is
designed specifically for surrogacy arrangements that take place between residents
of the United States and that she does not believe the United States should outlaw
commercial surrogacy as have most other developed countries. Her position,
though, is not based on the oft-cited and frankly unconvincing rationale that
surrogacy is a procreative right with which the government should not interfere12

5. Id. at 1230.
6. See id. at 1233–34, 1247.
7. Id. at 1223–24, 1254.
8. Id. at 1223–24, 1226, 1278–79 (pointing out the high level of satisfaction among the
players).
9. Id. at 1230.
10. Id. at 1228.
11. See id. at 1228–29.
12. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering
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but instead on empirical evidence demonstrating that the primary factors tending to
trigger the fear of exploitation in surrogacy are not present in domestic surrogacy
arrangements in the United States.13 With this important basis for objection out of
the way, Laufer-Ukeles’s task becomes addressing how regulation might assuage
qualms that commercial surrogacy places a transaction with deep emotional and
intimate components into the marketplace.14 This, in essence, is the mixed
commodification problem.
Since the market takes care of the commercial nature of surrogacy,15 the task is
to design regulation suitable for mixed commodification—regulation, in short, that
recognizes, honors, values, and promotes the intimacy of surrogacy. Empirical
studies reveal that surrogates prize above all else their emotional connection with
the couples paying for their services, and in particular it is the relationship between
the intended mother and the surrogate that is the strongest.16 Intimacy in surrogacy,
then, exists not only between the surrogate and the future child but also between the
surrogate and the couple who are commissioning her services.17 Surrogates seek
intimacy in these connections and expect that the birth will not mean the end of
them.18 Thus, the regulation that can help ensure the best outcomes will
acknowledge surrogates’ fundamental expectations19 so as to protect them from
emotional harm,20 support the other participants in the transaction,21 and quell the
societal fear that surrogacy undermines human dignity.22
The difficulty of developing regulation of this sort, of course, is to ensure that its
objective is not lost to excessive paternalism.23 In raising the theory of relational
autonomy, as she has in another context,24 Laufer-Ukeles reminds us that autonomy
does not exist in a vacuum but must be fostered within an environment where
“many social and contextual constraints and pressures” conspire to limit choice.25
The regulation of this mixed commodification context, then, must ensure that
surrogates are receiving complete and correct information about the process, are not
experiencing familial pressure, and are not suffering economic distress.26
With her theoretical framework firmly established, Laufer-Ukeles crafts a
regulatory model that distinguishes between what recognizing relational autonomy
would require and what, when added to these requirements, would further enhance
it. The most unfamiliar of these is her suggested mandatory provision that the
surrogate have the right to claim “infrequent but potentially ongoing visitation”

Difference, 26 VT. L. REV. 407, 410–14 (2002).
13. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1234–35.
14. Id. at 1243–44.
15. Id. at 1243.
16. Id. at 1232, 1237.
17. Id. at 1231–32.
18. Id. at 1232–33.
19. Id. at 1253–55.
20. Id. at 1238–39.
21. Id. at 1262–63.
22. Id. at 1259.
23. See id. at 1256–57.
24. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal
Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567 (2011).
25. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1249.
26. See id. at 1250.
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with the child27 in the rare event she has difficulty separating from the child. This
provision would likely influence the parties at the bargaining stage to reflect more
fully on the significance of their intimate undertaking and not to see the
arrangement as one that necessarily terminates with no further contact upon the
birth of the child.28 Such a provision might understandably dissuade those couples
desiring more decision-making control from pursuing surrogacy, but this would be
an acceptable outcome, as such couples would likely be less willing to
acknowledge and honor the intimate aspects of the surrogacy arrangement.
Other provisions in Laufer-Ukeles’s proposed regulatory framework seem more
familiar. Indeed, some are already reflected in the law or are part of common
practice. For instance, in some jurisdictions only gestational surrogacy is
permitted,29 making it less likely that the surrogate will refuse to relinquish the
child.30 Making counseling and psychological evaluation31 available to surrogates
before they embark on the journey is commonly recommended (and in some
jurisdictions is required),32 as is the mandate that the surrogate have experienced at
least one pregnancy resulting in a live birth.33 Even limits on compensation are not
unknown.34 Laufer-Ukeles labels these autonomy-promoting and exploitationavoiding measures,35 and indeed they appear to be appropriate screening devices
that help ensure the potential surrogate is fit and informed enough to undertake the
assignment. Verifying that these various steps have been completed could be part
of the judicial preapproval process for surrogacy arrangements that exists in some
states.36

27. Id. at 1254.
28. See id. at 1254–55.
29. See id. at 1259–61; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/6, 47/10 to /70 (West 2009); 410
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801 to -809
(LexisNexis 2012).
30. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 76, 77 (Supp.
2012) (“The . . . practice [of having the same woman serve as the gestational and genetic
mother] has elicited disfavor in the ART community, which has concluded that the
gestational mother’s genetic link to the child too often creates additional emotional and
psychological problems in enforcing a gestational agreement.”).
31. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1262–63.
32. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1–:32 (2002 & Supp. 2012); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78B-15-801 to -809 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (2008 &
Supp. 2012).
33. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17(V); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756 (West
2008 & Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160.
34. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.212–.213, 742.15–.16 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013)
(limiting the types of payment allowed); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (LexisNexis 2010)
(restricting payment to living and medical expenses related to the birth); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B:25 (limiting fees to medical expenses, lost wages, insurance, legal costs, and
home studies); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803 (payment must be “reasonable”).
35. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1259–65.
36. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(h) (providing for review by the court of preplanned
adoption agreements and requiring filing of a petition in connection with any preplanned
adoption agreement); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:21, 25 (laying out judicial
preauthorization provisions and mandatory signed surrogacy contract terms); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 160.755–.756; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-802 to -803; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-160 (judicial preauthorization provision); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 (amended
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It would be helpful to know whether other existing regulations promote LauferUkeles’s objectives. For example, in some jurisdictions “convenience” surrogacies
are unlawful—that is, the intended mother must be incapable of gestating a child.37
Furthermore, some jurisdictions require at least one of the intended parents to be
genetically related to the child.38 It is unclear whether either of these requirements
promotes the autonomy of surrogates, but they do arguably bind the intended
parents to the arrangement and might even inspire them to experience the intimacy
of their relationship with the surrogate in ways they may not otherwise. On the
autonomy-promoting side of the equation, Illinois’s requirement that the parties
must receive “independent legal counseling” seems particularly well suited to
promoting autonomy and averting exploitation.39
Finally, Laufer-Ukeles leaves unclear what she feels about the advisability of
provisions in some states that allow a surrogate who employs her own egg the right
to keep the child if she gives notice of her decision within a certain amount of time
after the birth.40 She is not entirely correct to say that the “right to rescind does not
apply in the context of surrogate motherhood,”41 since these provisions clearly
settle cases of “traditional surrogacy” within an adoption framework and make the
agreement voidable by the surrogate who decides to keep the child. While LauferUkeles gives no reason to doubt that traditional surrogates are as much invested as
gestational surrogates in the intimacy of the transaction and its benefits, perhaps the
more important point is that traditional surrogates, connected by both genes and
gestation to the fetuses they carry, may actually experience more intimacy or at
least more of a variety of intimacies than do gestational surrogates. After all, the
evidence shows that it is the genetic connection to the child that often complicates a
surrogate’s post-birth separation.42 The “cognitive dissonance”43 traditional
surrogates demonstrate on the question of whose child they are carrying suggests
that traditional surrogacy arrangements may not in many cases lead to the kind of
satisfaction Laufer-Ukeles believes gestational surrogacy can. Perhaps allowing
traditional surrogates, but not gestational surrogates, a period of time after the birth
to decide whether to proceed with or terminate the agreement is a necessary
compromise to strike in lieu of prohibiting traditional surrogacy altogether.

2002), 9B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2012) (explaining requirements for judicial preapproval of
gestational agreements).
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.212–.213, 742.15–.16; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160.
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.213, 742.13, .15; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20, /25;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §168-B:17(III); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801; VA. CODE ANN. §§
20-160. This is not a feature of the Uniform Parentage Act. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt.
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 76, 77 (“[T]here is no longer a requirement that at least one of
the intended parents would be genetically related to the child born of the gestational
agreement.”).
39. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20.
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (48 hours); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:25, -B:26 (72
hours); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-161 (180 days). Note that the New Hampshire statute does not
distinguish between traditional and gestational surrogacy.
41. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1252.
42. Id. at 1230–31, 1260–61.
43. Id. at 1261.

1286

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1281

The most novel facet of Laufer-Ukeles’s proposed framework is the right of the
surrogate to demand ongoing contact with the child.44 The idea seems to be that if
the surrogate has a right to demand ongoing contact, then perhaps the
commissioning couple will not be overbearing in their dealings with her. As a
practical matter, this requirement seems geared to eliminating the potential for
exploitation that many believe is inherent in surrogacy arrangements. But LauferUkeles seems to believe that surrogates in the United States are not exploited or at
least the factors that set the stage for exploitation are not present.45 Thus it may
seem at first blush that her proposal for contact is unnecessary. Nonetheless, since
her primary goal is to recognize and honor the intimacy in surrogacy arrangements,
it stands to reason that her proposal for contact is most likely to meet with success
in a setting like the United States, where empirical studies have shown that
intimacy is already experienced deeply on several levels among the parties to
surrogacy arrangements and that wide educational and economic disparities
between the parties are seldom in play.
II. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
It is precisely because Laufer-Ukeles’s analysis finds so much support in the
practice of domestic surrogacy in the United States that she is obligated to set aside
any argument for extending her proposed regulatory model to the international
context. By bracketing international surrogacy, which she finds altogether too
commercial and too impersonal,46 Laufer-Ukeles risks diluting the force of her
analysis by acknowledging that it applies only where we have less concern about
the potential for exploitation and more confidence in the potential for honoring the
intimacy in surrogacy transactions. Since she believes these linchpins of her
framework are considerably weakened as an empirical matter where couples from
developed countries engage surrogates living in impoverished circumstances
abroad, she urges countries with restrictions on surrogacy to find ways to
discourage international surrogacy and to encourage commissioning couples to use
domestic surrogates instead.47
The main problem with this suggestion is that it is difficult to reconcile it with
the political reality that in many of the countries to which Laufer-Ukeles refers the
debate, if one exists, revolves around whether to authorize altruistic surrogacy or
ban surrogacy altogether. Criminal provisions or immigration regulations exist in
these jurisdictions to dissuade citizens from pursuing international commercial

44. Id. at 1254–55.
45. See id. at 1234–35.
46. See id. at 1267–75. International commercial surrogacy occurs not only when
citizens of developed countries hire surrogates in developing countries. Indeed, there is a
robust international commercial surrogacy business coming to the United States as well.
Laufer-Ukeles is concerned about this latter form of international commercial surrogacy too,
since, although exploitation might be less of a concern, “the problem of distance and
detaching between the commissioning couple and the surrogate is [a] challenge” and an
obstacle to recognizing and honoring the intimacy in such transactions. Id. at 1266 n.257.
47. Id. at 1277–79.
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surrogacy. Compensating surrogates in these countries is, frankly, out of the
question.
France presents the latest example. The recent debate in that country, in
response to the many cases of French citizens pursuing international commercial
surrogacy,48 resulted in amendments to the Bioethics Law that did not include a
provision for allowing surrogacy or even bestowing citizenship on children who
have been born to French citizens with the help of surrogates abroad.49 Even in
liberal Spain, where gamete donation practices are not at all restricted, people often
exhibit a failure to understand surrogacy if not outright alarm over it. It actually is
the case in such jurisdictions, as Laufer-Ukeles suggests it is not in the United
States, that the “focus on gestation is . . . because of a belief that women ‘should’
gestate their children,”50 and that is so for the very reasons outlined in the “Harms
of Commodification” section of Mothering for Money.51 Consider in the same
connection the following excerpt from Proceed with Care: “[C]ommercial
preconception arrangements commodify women’s reproduction functions and place
women in the situation of alienating aspects of themselves that should be inherently
inalienable. A preconception contract obliges the gestational mother to sell an
intimate aspect of her human functioning . . . .”52
The fact that disincentivizing traveling for surrogacy, whether to developing
countries or to the United States, would require, first, permitting surrogacy and,
second, permitting surrogates to be compensated, means that the disincentives
Laufer-Ukeles proposes are unlikely to materialize.
CONCLUSION
What I appreciate most about Mothering for Money is its heartfelt effort to find
common ground on which those who assume diametrically opposed positions on
surrogacy can stand together. In crafting a regulatory framework that is protective
of the parties to the transaction, including the child who benefits from continuing
contact with the surrogate mother, Laufer-Ukeles acknowledges, as the most
thoughtful scholars do, that neither autonomy nor fears of exploitation and
commodification are all or nothing in the surrogacy debate.
As it has done for thirty years, surrogacy will continue to provoke a “whirlwind
of agitation.”53 Policymaking may not be at its best in such an atmosphere. Suffice
it to say, though, that commentaries such as Laufer-Ukeles’s are essential in our
effort to defend our positions on surrogacy with reason instead of emotion and to
ask whether these positions are supported by empirical evidence. Of course,

48. Charlotte Rotman, Gestation pour Autrui: Les Enfants Fantômes de la Republique,
LA LIBÉRATION (Fr.) (May 20, 2009, 6:51 AM), available at http://www.liberation.fr/
societe/0101568271-gestation-pour-autrui-les-enfants-fantomes-de-la-republique (reporting
on the estimated 400 French couples who travel abroad each year to hire a surrogate mother).
49. Eric Favereau & Charlotte Rotman, Bioéthique, un débat peu fécond, LA
LIBÉRATION (Fr.) (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.liberation.fr/societe/
01012320018-bioethique-un-debat-peu-fecond.
50. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1257.
51. Id. at 14–15.
52. ROYAL COMM’N ON NEW REPROD. TECHS., PROCEED WITH CARE 683–84 (1993).
53. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1224.
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Mothering for Money will not convince those who cleave unerringly to the notion
that surrogacy is unavoidably exploitative or is always autonomy-promoting on a
more symbolic or abstract level, but nor does it need to. It is enough that LauferUkeles’s vision is likely to convince those who are currently undecided about
surrogacy and even those who have strong opinions but are nonetheless open to a
theory that takes us in a new and enlightened direction.

